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Executive Summary 
 
This research examined how transition to decentralization in Kyrgyzstan fosters economic 
growth. The study was set out to answer the following research questions: 
 (1) Determine what is the most efficient incentive mechanism that could be applied for sound 
system of relations between central and local government in Kyrgyzstan?, 
 (2) Identify areas of fiscal decentralization principles that hinder efficient service delivery and 
economic performance within the country.  
The dimensions being reviewed in this paper were tax assignation to various level of 
government, sources of revenue, mainly local tax and non-tax revenues, transfers and grants and 
their relationship to decentralization degree. 
This paper focused mainly on two assumption that (1) Broadening the scope of local tax and 
increasing the degree of self-finance, with reduction of transfers and grants could lead to sound 
system of relations between central and local government in Kyrgyzstan, providing incentive 
mechanism to reach maximal level of the efficiency, (2) For a small developing country like 
Kyrgyzstan, with less diversified economy, centralized form of governance is more desirable. 
The study used qualitative analysis based on secondary data, mainly from ADB, World Bank, 
and National Portal on Open Budget, and re-confirmed for Kyrgyzstan that current system of 
governance remains centralized due to lack of authority delegated to local government and 
inability to sustain economic growth without significant amount of transfers. The research 
findings from the current study supported the two assumptions.  
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
1.1 Background 
Based on the experience of the developed countries, transition to decentralized form of 
governance for the developing countries can be seen as right instrument to overcome daily 
problems of the regions, since decentralized state is more aware of local needs, economic 
activities of its citizens on local levels as well as it gives good incentives for rent-seeking . Coase 
Theorem supports the idea of decentralization to foster economic efficiency stating that 
delegation of services to the lower levels of government will lead to more efficient resource 
allocation, reduce transaction costs while disseminating information and enabling market players 
to negotiate their way to the efficiency.   
There is no clear set of rules for perfectly-defined degree of decentralization level countries in 
transition period like Kyrgyzstan should use to be successful. Based on available literature and 
case studies we can conclude that each country should select its own the most optimal degree of 
decentralization based on country’s population, historical background, political issues, 
geographical location, economic development, etc. Based on understanding country’s specific 
characteristics the most appropriate degree of decentralization should be introduced to enhance 
economic efficiency, introduce and maintain incentives for governing, transparency. It took some 
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countries like China almost a century to decentralize, other countries, like Central Asian 
Countries, reformed their system of governance within extremely short period of time, thus 
keeping a lot of features of a previous regime in a new, so-called “decentralized” government. 
1.2 History of Decentralization in Kyrgyzstan 
Kyrgyzstan, a landlocked mountainous country with limited natural resources, frequent natural 
disasters, was one of the poorest states in Soviet Union. For Kyrgyz Republic, after 
dissemination of the Soviet Union, the decentralization was one of the key elements in transition 
to democracy, since it is according to democratic principles to transfer the authority for decision-
making to local levels. Relatively rapid transition to decentralization was also caused by the 
weakness of newly formed central government.  
Country’s GDP growth from 1990 to 2009 shows the weakness and lack of sustainability of 
Kyrgyz economy at given period of time.  
Sudden and severe drop of country’s GDP in early 1990’s is the result of Soviet Union collapse, 
and as a result crisis in all industries. In conditions of “shock therapy” (fast liberalization, 
abandon of central planning principles, no control on pricing issues and competition as the main 
market tool) hundreds of factories and plants stopped their operations and the process of 
deindustrialization took place. People learned to rely on themselves, and many males of 
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productive age left the country to work in Russia and Kazakhstan in order to send remittance to 
their families.  
Kyrgyz GDP growth rate (from 1990 to 2009)    
 Source: World Bank countries GDP database 
In 1994 GDP reached its critical point (-20%) due to currency crisis when new currency (som) 
had been introduced in 1993. All personal savings were devaluated due to inflation. There was 
no production as well as no profit from trade (due to closed external boarders).  
This year is also remarkable for established relations with western countries, who through their 
organizations (IMF, UNDP) provided assistance and technical support to reform legislation, 
governance, etc.  Given assistance did not lead to sudden increase of GDP growth in 1995 due to 
beginning of privatization, when a number of people were involved in speculation activities: 
buying out low-priced state’s assets and reselling them overpriced. Shadow economy was widely 
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spread, thus data on GDP growth in 1995 might be slightly different from actual growth rate.  
In 1996 people became involved in trade not only with Russia, but also with China, India. 
Sudden increase of country’s GDP in 1996-1997 was influenced with introduction of following 
industries: gold mining, revival of cement production plant, production of tobacco alcohol 
beverages. Nevertheless, electricity, machinery, textiles, sugar and meat industries are in critical 
condition of recession.  
In 1998 Kyrgyzstan became a member of WTO, commerce and service sectors are developing. 
Products made in Kyrgyzstan are not competitive in international market, thus buying products 
from China, Turkey “chelnochestvo” and selling in Kyrgyzstan became the main source of 
income for many people.  
In 2003-2004 world economy had been relatively stable, purchasing power of neighboring 
countries increased, Kyrgyz GDP increased because of trade and gold mining industry.  Period of 
2003-2004 was an era of increase of total foreign trade turnover, Kyrgyz economy, like economy 
of developing countries economy has gradually improved, since the country was actively 
engaged in re-exports.  
In 2004, the law on Cooperatives had been introduced to develop agriculture sector, unite 
farmers and assign role to local government to provide incentives for local growth, but it did not 
influence GDP growth significantly. The reason might be hidden in tax distribution between 
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local and central levels. VIT, income tax and custom duties are the main sources of country’s 
income. Their collection is centralized and local government remains dependent on central 
budget.  
Political instability in the country resulted decline of GDP in 2005, 2008 and following years.  
From 2000-2003 a number of laws on decentralization has been adopted covering the issues of 
self-governance and local state administration, property rights, finance. National strategy 
“Decentralization of public administration and local government development in Kyrgyz 
Republic before 2010” has been approved by Presidential Decree. However, the actual attempt to 
reform local governance showed the formality of given legislation, as the structure of governance 
and the balance of power remained unchanged (Asanakunov, 2003) 
1.3 State Administration in Kyrgyzstan 
Kyrgyzstan practices multilevel system of governance: central (national), regional, rayon, 
municipal (ayil okmotu, village self-governing units). In 2007 two-tier fiscal structure between 
central government and village self-governing units had been established by the government, 
formally involving regional government into budgetary matters. One year later, in 2008, the 
three-tier system had been introduced, where importance of the local government was 
maintained. Division into too many tiers of government can cause the problem of coordination of 
service provision in all levels, as well as it can bring additional cost for taxpayers.  
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Local government taxes are regulated by the tax code, which, according to Taranchieva (2007), 
undergone through “forty two amendments” and yet keeps a lot of controversial arguments. 
There is no coherent connection between tax code and accepted laws on tax policy. Tax code 
assigns tax inspectors from central government to collect local taxes, while the law on “Financial 
and Economic Basics” delegates the authority to collect local tax and non-tax payments to 
subnational tax officers (Taranchieva, 2007).     
Fiscal structure of Governance in Kyrgyzstan (2007)  
Levels of government Number of jurisdictions 
Central (National) government   
Regional Level (7 Oblasts, Bishkek 
and Osh cities) 9 
Raion Level (raion in Oblasts) 40 
Municipal Level   
 Ayil okmotu 494 
 Villages 1,847 
Total 2,390 
Source: Taranchieva (2007) 
There is a big inconsistency in Budget principles, when in theory the entire system is built based 
on principles of cooperation between local and central government, presenting one shared budget 
system with condition of availability of own sources of income at all levels of government. 
Authority for decision making is important. When it comes to practice, subnational governments 
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are highly dependent on central government and, according to Taranchieva (2007), fiscal system 
of Kyrgyzstan is “built on the principle of centralism”.  
The weakness of given system and difference between tax code and laws raise the issue of Moral 
Hazard among some local authorities, who “overstep legal limits in budget design and approval, 
while others do not even submit their budgets to central bodies”(Taranchieva, 2007) due to not 
clearly defined responsibilities and authority on various levels of budgetary system.  
Bertelsmann Stiftung (2010) questions the effectiveness of administrative offices, especially in 
regional levels due to lack of funds, hidden channels of state’s influence, incompetence of local 
managers (so-called local authorities) and high level of corruption.  
1.4 Hindering Factors 
The main argument in favor of fiscal decentralization talks about efficient resource allocation 
and increased local influence. Several factors hinder given positive outcomes of fiscal 
decentralization in Kyrgyzstan: unclear budgetary policy and income distribution, hidden 
channels of state influence and increased probability of corruption.  
Due to unclear budgetary support of the local government by the central government, central 
government has a privilege to transfer “unfunded” spending mandates from central to local 
budgets without increasing revenue responsibilities, thus increasing local budget’s deficit. 
Moreover, central government still continues to manage local government through their local 
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offices. According to Taranchieva (2007), significant numbers of central state administrators 
work in field, regulating and monitoring local government activities. Administrators adjust 
central and local budgets relationships as well.  
Tanzi (2000) finds subnational government less transparent who, comparing with central 
government, in most cases doesn’t publish annual reports open for public use, and there is almost 
no fiscal data available on the lower levels. In addition, local mass media is highly dependent on 
subnational government. 
For the recent years debates and arguments were taking place on the issue of nominating local 
authorities (regional chiefs). According to previous constitution (prior to 2010) regional chiefs 
are appointed by regional deputies, new constitution keeps it unclear whether they will be 
nominated by direct voting or nominated by regional deputies. Constitution states that “regional 
chiefs of executing bodies are nominated in accordance with Kyrgyz Republic legislation”, 
bringing confusion and further debates on the selection process. 
Given conditions make local authorities highly influenced by central government, who, in their 
turn, act as central government agents, rather than representing interests and needs of the local 
communities. Hidden channels of state influence are more likely to take place, when nominated 
by regional deputies local authorities promote states interests. Junosov (2011), claims that there 
might be a case when people with no prior experience in government service and with little 
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knowledge of self-governance can be elected due to corruption and support of the clans.   
Moreover, there is a higher probability that local elites are better at “taking over the power” on 
local level (Tanzi, 2000).  
Ideal relationship between central and local governments and their role distribution can be seen 
in developed economies with successful decentralization model like Central and Eastern Europe, 
when there is a clear separation of powers and increasing decentralizing expenditures.  
Budget constrains allocated for decentralization processes are causing the problems of incentives. 
According to Libman (2008), decentralization in existing institutional environment is unable to 
generate good incentives for proper governance due to deficit of resources.  Asanakunov (2003) 
states that the delegation of power to the local level was not supported with financial resources, 
or the delegation of power was a formal procedure, keeping previous local authorities on the 
local level.  
1.5 Research Objectives 
Thus, taking into consideration the factors hindering decentralization in Kyrgyzstan like inability 
of the current system to generate good incentives for proper governance, deficit of resources, 
unclear budgetary support for local government, and hidden channels of state influence this 
research aims to: 
10 
 
1. Analyze process of fiscal decentralization in Kyrgyz Republic, look at budget allocation 
policies,  taxation and transfers schemes to mark the most problematic areas, which do 
not represent decentralization principles or being misused by certain officials, thus 
hindering efficient service delivery and overall economic performance; 
2. Evaluate efficiency of income distribution between central and regional/local government, 
level of regional financial independence and compare economic growth between regions 
and cities (who share budget with central government) to estimate country’s sustainable 
development 
1.6 Research Questions  
Throughout the research two main questions will be addressed: 
1. What is the most efficient incentive mechanism that could be applied for sound system of 
relations between central and local government in Kyrgyzstan?  
2. Which areas of fiscal decentralization principles hinder efficient service delivery and 
economic performance within the country?  
1.7 Structure of the Report 
The paper is divided into two main parts. The first section contains theoretical framework 
describing key decentralization theories on intergovernmental relations, the relationship between 
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decentralization and economic performance, lack of efficiency as a result of inappropriate 
transition to decentralization as well as it provides brief outline of decentralization processes in 
Russia, Kazakhstan in comparison with Kyrgyzstan and successful case studies on transition in 
Poland (Chapter Two and part of Chapter Three). 
The second part of the research (from Chapter Three to Chapter Four) focuses on Kyrgyzstan. 
Based on statistical sources of data and country reports, Chapter Three and Chapter Four analyze 
macro-economic efficiency of fiscal decentralization, budget allocation among oblasts and city 
of Bishkek and Osh, estimate capability of subnational government to rely on own sources of 
finance (mainly from local tax gathering), look at factors which do not represent decentralization 
principles or being misused, thus hindering efficient service delivery and overall economic 
performance. Research findings will be further discussed and analyzed in Chapter Four. Chapter 
Five is the final chapter of the report and presents conclusions and recommendations.  
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Chapter Two 
Conceptual Framework 
2.1 Introduction 
Section begins with providing definition and main features of decentralization and followed by 
focus on fiscal decentralization in comparison with centralization. Theories on intergovernmental 
relations, incentive mechanisms are discussed, giving special attention to reasons causing these 
processes and to risks as well as benefits, associated with the process of decentralization. To 
understand the process of decentralization, factors that influence implementation of efficient 
decentralization are considered with provision of examples when transition to decentralization 
was successful in Poland and less successful in Russia and Kazakhstan. An attempt is made to 
examine the relationship between decentralization and sustainable growth of the country. The 
main question is whether or not decentralization had a positive impact on economic growth in 
selected countries with particular reference to Kyrgyzstan and to what level the country should 
decentralized.  
2.2 Key Concepts of Decentralization 
World Bank (2000) defines decentralization as “the transfer of political, administrative and fiscal 
responsibilities to locally elected bodies in urban and rural areas, and the empowerment of 
communities to exert control over these bodies”.  
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Fiscal decentralization is defined as “decentralization of governance, expenditure delivery and 
revenue mobilization” (Bahl: Linn, 1994). It is important to keep in mind that fiscal autonomy is 
an important element of decentralization to improve both central and local governments.  
Centralized form of governance can be more efficient for the developing countries. Bahl: Linn 
(1994) state that countries with less diversified economy are more vulnerable to international 
change of commodity prices, financial crisis, natural disasters, wars. Therefore the role of the 
central government to control main tax and borrowing is necessary.  
Central government plays important role in intergovernmental income distribution that leads to 
economic development through subsidies and adjusted tax policies. As the last argument 
supporting centralization, Bahl: Linn (1994) conclude that national government has more 
competences and expertise in taxation and public service delivery, while local government has 
“very weak administrative practices” in almost every country. 
Nevertheless, majority of developing countries with transition economies see fiscal 
decentralization as the main element for economic development.  
 
2.2.1 Arguments supporting Decentralization 
“The existence and pervasiveness of externalities would –in the presence of unlimited ability of a 
centralized authority to gather, process, and disseminate information-provide a strong argument 
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for centralization. But the ability to gather, process, and disseminate information is limited. 
These limitations form the basis of the argument for decentralization” Stiglitz (1994)  
Thus, among a number of arguments supporting decentralization, main statement deals with 
efficient allocation of resources.  
 
2.2.2 Efficient allocation of the resources  
According to ADB (2000), strong local self-government is more efficient, compared to central 
government, in the management or implementation of small to medium projects due to closer 
supervision and greater accountability of local officials to local communities.  
The economic efficiency increases by moving government closer to people, since local 
government is more aware of people’s needs and in ideal situation delivers special services for 
different regions based on religion, ethnical background and other individual features of 
population (Oates, 1972). Thus, taxpayers get incentives to contribute to regional development 
and get necessary services provided by the government.  
Main question here is how motivated are taxpayers to receive improved level of services by 
paying higher rate of tax? Maybe in case of developed countries local population has higher 
incomes to be willing to pay more tax for good service delivery, but in developing countries, like 
Kyrgyzstan, when 65% of population lives in rural areas, with 35% out of 65 % living below 
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poverty line (portal of rural poverty),  people prefer to cut down expenditures to cover local 
budget deficit. High level of corruption among governmental authorities (both on central and 
local levels) can be seen as another obstacle to earn trust of local tax payers. 
2.2.3 Increased accountability  
Bahl (2008) sees increased accountability of local governance in decentralized form of 
governance because local officials become directly responsible for provision of good-quality 
services delivered to local community who elected them. In case of centralized system, there is a 
greater chance for local government to escape from taking responsibility, thus they have less 
incentives to provide good level of services.  
Nevertheless, if we look at Kyrgyzstan, as previously discussed in Chapter One, regional leaders 
are nominated by regional government and not through the direct voting. Therefore, they would 
rather act as central government agents rather than meeting local needs.  
Unclear delegation of power and fiscal authority from central to local levels makes it difficult to 
achieve transparency of current system. Absence of transparent formula to estimate the amount 
of upcoming equalization grants and transfers for each region is known as another hindering 
factor.  
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2.2.4 Local revenue increase 
One more point in favor of decentralization is also described by Bahl (2008) stating that fiscal 
decentralization has potential to increase local revenue by broadening overall tax base: “Small 
firms, most individuals and owners of immovable property are “under-represented” in the tax 
base. Local government can broaden the overall tax base with a variety of tax instruments and 
administrative measures. These instruments include payroll taxes, levies on sales of assets of 
rims, licenses to operate, betterment charges and various forms of property taxation” 
Tax base in Kyrgyzstan 
Currently, state budget of Kyrgyzstan includes republican, oblast, Bishkek, rayon and ayil 
okmotu budgets. There are three types of taxes specially assigned to each level of government: 
local taxes (consisting of 18 types), shared taxes and regulated taxes. Local government keeps 
revenues generated through local taxes collection. “The two most important local taxes are land 
tax in all oblasts other than Bishkek, and the tax on retain sales, in Bishkek” (ADB, 2000).  With 
present tax base revenue share for local government is lower compared with expenditure share, 
therefore subnational budget highly relies on intergovernmental transfers and equalization grants.  
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2.3 Conditions for efficient transition to decentralized form of governance 
Decentralization has positive impact on overall macroeconomic stability only in condition that 
both central and local governments are committed to fiscal discipline in revenues and 
expenditure management.   
Accountability of local government depends on its elections and transparency of information to 
enable voters to evaluate expenditures decisions of local government. In many developing 
countries, one or more of these conditions are not met (Bahl, 2008).  
Institutions are the main stakeholders of decentralization, as they are defined as “the rules of the 
game”. They are resistant to change even when reforms has long-term perspectives (EBRD, 
2009). Unwillingness to lose privileged positions makes current institutions impose short-term 
costs to hinder efficient implementation.  
Institutional structure can change over time when the opponents, supporting reforms get stronger 
and increase in size to promote their interests. Institutions can change due to a large shock, like 
collapse of the Soviet Union, economic crisis, national emergency when the process of change 
gets accelerated.  
Large shock makes previous policy failures visible, encourage learning from experience and 
show the need to introduce changes in regulatory framework or institutional structure (EBRD, 
2009). 
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Kyrgyzstan went on transition from previously strongly centralized form of governance to 
decentralized form due to weakness of central government after the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
Nevertheless, central government wanted to maintain its power on local level. According to 
ADB country evaluation report (2000), actual form of governance in Kyrgyzstan remained 
strongly centralized.  
Among risk factors emerging as a result of transition to decentralization several factors are 
described in this paper.  
 
2.4 Probability of corruption level increase 
As previously discussed, decentralization leads to the efficient resource allocation thus 
promoting efficiency and sustainability in the economy with the hypothesis that local influence 
over public sector is increased. According to Bardhan and Mookherjee (2000), with transition to 
fiscal decentralization there is further risk that power will simply shift from central to 
subnational authorities, giving greater chance for increased level of corruption.  
Era Dabla-Norris (2006) emphasizes the importance of institutional framework and the degree of 
accountability to minimize the impact of financial decentralization on corruption.  
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2.5 Measuring Decentralization 
All developing countries with decentralized form of governance used to be centralized in the past, 
with similar political structures, when local authorities were acting more as central government 
agents, with limited fiscal responsibility. Based on different approaches towards decentralization, 
some of the countries became more decentralized.  
It is important to notice, that it is very difficult to measure the level of decentralization, since 
they are several factors contributing to it. Decentralization involves not only the expenditure 
assignment and revenue responsibilities, but also the extent of subnational policymaking 
autonomy (Era Dabla-Norris, 2006). Thus, regular approach to measurement of decentralization, 
when the share of subnational spending is viewed against total governmental spending in some 
cases can give wrong results, as increased subnational spending does not reflect decision-making 
authority on the local level.  
Table 1 indicates expenditure assignment for each level of government in Kyrgyzstan, 
Kazakhstan, Russia and successfully decentralized Poland.  
Kyrgyzstan, compared to Russia and Kazakhstan, excluding Poland, has the highest subnational 
spending on social insurance and health services and the highest subnational spending on 
education (45% in comparison with 27.5% in Poland). Nevertheless, that factor does not 
influence emergence of high decentralization degree in the country, as, according to ADB 
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country evaluation report (2000), conclusion has been made that Kyrgyzstan had centralized 
system of governance estimating the same year the statistics on subnational expenditure is 
presented. Instead, given conditions of high expenditure assignment delegated to subnational 
government and deficit in local budget result in reduced quality of services delivered or limited 
number of services delivered as local budget needs to cut down their expenses to meet budget 
constraints.  Moreover, to secure funds for high share of spending covered by subnational 
government, transfers and grants are the main source of finance. In many developing countries, 
including Kyrgyzstan, the annual flow of grants and transfers from central to local budgets is not 
fixed or clearly defined by transparent formula, causing the weakness of, in given example, 
education and health sectors in conditions of under financing.   
2.6 Sources of Finance for Subnational Governments 
From the supply side, several sources of finance for subnational governments are considered: 
own revenues (obtained mainly from local taxes gathering), intergovernmental transfers (or 
equalization grants), tax sharing, subnational borrowing, etc.  
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Table 1 Expenditure structure for each level of government (% of total) 
 Country Level 
General 
public 
services 
Defense 
and 
public 
order 
Social 
insurance 
and 
health 
services 
Education 
Culture 
and 
recreation 
Other Total 
Kazakhstan 
(2000) 
Central 6.6 14.2 42.6 3.6 1.2 31.7 100 
Regional 
& Local 3.5 5.1 22.2 23.6 4.3 41.3 100 
Kyrgyz 
Republic 
(2000) 
Central 14.9 16 20.5 19.5 2.9 26.2 100 
Regional 
& Local  9.4 1.5 28.40 45 3.4 12.3 100 
Russia 
(2000) 
Central 7.6 17.8 32.5 2.3 0.7 39.1 100 
Regional 
& Local 25.6 2.8 19.20 17.8 3.5 31.1 100 
Poland 
(2000) 
Central 4 7.5 51.9 4.7 0.5 31.2 100 
Regional 
& Local  7.2 4.1 32 27.5 3.7 25.5 100 
 
Source: Era Dabla-Norris, 2006 
 
Sub-national borrowing might be quite influential for country’s macroeconomic conditions. 
Excessive borrowing might be dangerous for country’s economy:  sub-national deficits can lead 
to bailout by national government. On the other hand, subnational governments should have 
certain degree of access to borrowing to cover short-term fiscal deficit. World Bank talks about 
number of approaches in allowing sub-national borrowing: 
Reliance on market discipline (open capital markets, adequate information, responsiveness of 
borrowers to market signals, and no-bail out policy of central government) is used by federal 
countries like the United States.  
Majority of developing countries directly control subnational borrowing by setting limits, 
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individual approval of loans and borrowing through Central Bank. Subnational governments 
have certain ways to broaden the limits for borrowing, therefore both sides should have 
incentives to properly manage and control subnational borrowing.  
Own revenues include local taxes available for economic development of subnational 
government. In Kyrgyzstan, for instance, two main sources of local tax include property tax and 
land tax. In order to broaden local tax base, Bahl (2008) suggests to introduce “variety of tax 
instruments and administrative measures. These instruments include payroll taxes, levies on sales 
of assets of rims, licenses to operate, betterment charges and various forms of property taxation”. 
Proposed mechanism will be more efficient in case of transparency and system of checks and 
balances not only between central and regional/local governments, but between subnational 
government and local taxpayers to avoid corruption level increase and strengthen incentive of 
taxpayers to contribute to regional development.   
Bahl: Linn (1994) see grants as a consensus between the power to increase revenues and 
expenditure responsibilities, with central government retaining its authority to “tax productive 
resource bases” while local governance has a guarantee of revenue flow. In accordance with the 
structure of grant system, local government can plan their budget, thus local government can 
finance provision of local services, while central government can control the degree of autonomy.  
This can be an important step in transition to decentralization. Needless to say, that there should 
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be one common methodology to regulate fiscal policies regarding transfer allocation and its 
amount. In most of selected in this research countries but Poland delegation of transfer amount 
depends on negotiation with Ministry of Finance, and has “gap-filling” character. Transfer in 
Kazakhstan is realized by withdrawing money from the richest regions and reallocating to the 
poorest. Poland implements transfer in accordance with transparent formula (Dabla-Norris, 
2006).   
The first argument in favor of decentralization described in given research states that taxpayers 
have incentives to contribute to the increased level of services provided by local government by 
paying more taxes. 
Figure 1 Grants from Central to Local governments, % of GDP 
 
Source: Government Finance Statistics (IMF), 2001 
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Transfer system in Kazakhstan increases the risk that in given conditions Moral Hazard can take 
place when poorest states will have no incentives to contribute to economic efficiency of the 
region, fully relying on intergovernmental transfers. Consequently, there is a probability for the 
richest region to lose incentives to broaden its tax base, thus maximal efficiency will not be 
achieved.  
The last indicator to measure decentralization level used in this chapter will focus on the 
relationship between own revenues of subnational government and tax sharing, using IMF 
approach and data. (Ela Dabra-Norris, 2006) defines the case of tax sharing when “revenues 
from taxes shared on a derivation basis, whose structures can only be changed at the central level, 
accounting for the largest share of regional revenue receipts.”  
Table 2 Sources of finance for subnational government 
Country Tax sharing Own-financing 
Kazakhstan 100 0 
Kyrgyzstan 64.6 35.4 
Russia 60 40 
Poland 57.7 42.3 
Source: Era Dabla-Norris, 2006 
It is interesting to notice, that all of presented countries highly rely on intergovernmental tax-
sharing and have limited opportunities to rely on own revenues. Poland, as a country who was a 
front-runner in transition to decentralization, has the lowest tax sharing degree among 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Russia, still prevailing over own-financing.  
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Ela Dobra-Norris (2006) analyzes impact of present structure of financial sources of subnational 
government on formation of potential risk of informal revenue generating as a result of limited 
abilities for self finance by subnational government stating that “in many countries, limited 
formal revenue autonomy has encouraged the widespread use of informal revenue generating 
mechanisms, such as tax offsets and extra budgetary funds”.  
Intergovernmental transfers in many countries, especially Central Asian Countries, depend on 
country’s GDP growth and budget. In case of budget deficit number of grants can decline, thus 
causing deficit in subnational budgets or reduction of services provided by local government. 
Inconsistency of allowances flow to subnational government can result in reduced economic 
efficiency and growth of the region.  
2.6 Conclusion 
Industrialized countries are more successful in transition to decentralization, while developing 
countries with budget deficit and small population can consider to keep centralized form of 
governance to respond on external shock like financial crisis, inflation and natural disasters. 
Besides, central government has more competencies to mobilize revenues.  
Decentralized form of governance results in better allocation of resources, transparency and 
provides system of checks and balances.   
Proper management of taxes distribution plays important role in transition to decentralization. 
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Local governments doesn’t have variety of formal tax revenues, central government provides 
intergovernmental transfers and grants for equalization. In many countries the amount of grants 
and transfers depends on certain factors with no transparent formula to estimate the amount for 
next year. Given situation leads to Moral Hazard and questions decentralization efficiency for 
developing countries.  
Following Chapter Three will start with assumption that broadening the scope of the local tax 
and increasing the degree of self-finance, with reduction of transfers and grants could lead to 
sound system of relations between central and local government in Kyrgyzstan, providing 
incentive mechanism to reach maximal level of the efficiency.  
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Chapter Three 
Data and Methods 
The study area consists of urban and regional areas in Kyrgyzstan. Areas were selected as a unit 
of analysis as this scope is the most reasonable to evaluate income distribution and the 
performance of regions with support of grants and local finance. In addition, actual secondary 
data, gathered by ADB group in 2000 is available for further comparison and evaluation.  This 
study will focus on major revenue sources of local government, its sustainability without 
transfers and equalization grants, expenditure assignment by oblasts.  
Supplementary country-level data was obtained through internet investigation. Official website 
of Kyrgyz Republic Ministry of Finance discloses open budget 
(http://portal.infosystema.kg/openbudget/income/main.action) provides data (as of 2011) on 
income classification by central and local budgets and less transparent division of country’s 
expenses by territory. Portal (http://budget.kg) describes state budget’s revenues and 
expenditures (years 2000-2008) and more importantly, inter budgetary relations between oblasts 
(Chui, Talas, Osh, Naryn, Issyk-Kul, Jalal-Abad, Batken), Osh and Bishkek cities as of 2008. 
Portal on Kyrgyz budget gives some clarity on total revenues and official transfers by regions, 
income generated from various taxes and several types of grants and transfers.  
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In general, Kyrgyzstan consists of seven oblasts and two cities: Bishkek and Osh, who have 
more autonomy in decision making and tax collection. Bishkek is located in Chui Oblast; Osh 
geographically is the part of Osh Oblast. 
1- City of Bishkek; 9- City of Osh 
2- Batken Oblast 
3- Chui Oblast 
4- Jalal-Abad Oblast 
5- Naryn Oblast 
6-Osh Oblast 
7- Talas Region  
8-Issyk-kul Region 
Absence of transparent formula in estimating amount of grants for next year to be received by 
subnational government, discussed in previous chapter hinders efficient regional development 
and planning by subnational authorities. ADB (2000) suggest formula for estimating the amount 
of grants for each region depending on its level of economic development and other factors: 
(r)pc   P
r 
(r)pc   - per capita annual amount of equalization grant to be received by Rayon “r” 
P
r   
- indicator of poverty in Rayon “r” 
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  -parameter to distribute equalization grants to each rayon in the country 
the amount of total equalization grants to be distributed should be clear in order to 
calculate  
Presented formula is user-friendly; moreover, it can solve problems of uncertainty, corruption. 
Information, needed to make calculations according to given formula, might be limited on lowest 
levels, therefore ADB (2000) assumes regional government get equalization grants and further 
manages distribution to the lower levels, taking accountability for this action.  
Given information assists in testing the assumption previously raised in conclusion of Chapter 
Two that by reducing the amount of transfers, grants and broadening the scope of local taxes it 
could lead to financial stability of the regions and provide more incentives for subnational proper 
management, while increased amount of transfers leads to decline of subnational resources 
generation due to lack of incentives and fear to lose high amounts of intergovernmental transfers. 
Intergovernmental finance relationship matrix is used as the main analytical tool to evaluate 
intergovernmental fiscal relations, when transfers are used to secure vertical and horizontal fiscal 
imbalances.  
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Intergovernmental finance relationship matrix 
 
Tax administration brings revenues flow to central government and not necessarily expenditures. 
Grants are filling vertical imbalances to fix the gap between subnational expenditures and 
revenues. In majority of cases the revenue of subnational government, generated from the 
collection of local taxes is not sufficient to meet the expenditure side. Transfers from central to 
subnational government can solve the problem of vertical imbalance when subnational 
government’s expenses exceed actual revenue.   
This research focuses on correlation between increase/decline of transfers from central to 
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subnational governments and financial performance of subnational government resulting in 
increase/reduction of own sources of revenues over years.  
Another type of intergovernmental transfers- transfers from one subnational government to 
another, can solve the problem of horizontal imbalances so that all subnational governments 
could provide “similar levels of local service” (ADB, 2000).  
Given paper elaborates further discussions on long-term efficiency and feasibility of this 
particular approach in Kyrgyz conditions in Chapter Four.  
In order to approach second Research Question aiming to identify the areas related to fiscal 
decentralization principles that hinder efficient service delivery and economic performance 
within the country information, previously gathered in Chapter Two (limited scope of 
subnational government’s formal tax revenues, dependency of the amount of grants and transfers 
on certain factors with no transparent formula to estimate the amount for next year and thus 
failure to effectively plan activities on local level, little authority in fiscal decision making 
delegated to subnational government)  are going to be analyzed and tested against the main 
assumption that Kyrgyzstan, as a small country in transition stage, with unstable economy is 
more efficient in centralized form of governance at given period of time.  
Flowchart of analytical framework provided in Chapter Four, shows the logic in answering 
second research question and defines key issues that need to be analyzed in following chapter. 
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Chapter Four 
Analysis and Discussions 
Analysis and discussion presented in this chapter are derived from the secondary data analysis, 
mainly from Kyrgyz Republic Ministry of Finance portal on open budget (data available for the 
year 2008) and ADB country report on fiscal decentralization from 2001, focusing on revenue 
distribution by oblasts and cities of Bishkek and Osh, spending by function, major sources of 
revenue for local governments, and sustainability of local revenues.   
The purpose of analysis of given data is to point out the importance of own revenues and reduced 
amount of transfers for incentives to achieve increased efficiency of local governance.  
4.1 Analysis for the first research question 
Figure 2 shows major revenue sources for local government in Kyrgyzstan compared by regions, 
including revenues from equalization grants, categorical grants, taxes and non-tax revenues. 
It can be clearly seen from Figure 2 that major sources of finance for subnational government are 
transfers from national government. Next important source of finance for subnational 
government is derived from taxes (both shared and locally collected). For ayil okmotu level, land 
tax is the only type of tax.  
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Figure 2 Major Revenue Sources for Local Government (as of 1999) 
 
Source: ADB country report 2000 
Bishkek, with special status assignation to be independent from oblast and rayon as a city, has 
the highest revenue share from taxes and non-tax revenues, with non-existing or negative 
equalization grants, is awarded small share of categorical grants (less than 5%).  Fiscal 
sustainability of Naryn Oblast, with lowest own revenues among other regions and highest share 
of equalization and categorical grants, is highly dependent on equalization grants and categorical 
grants, having small capacity to generate profit from collection of local taxes and non-tax 
revenues.  It mainly happens to the relatively small and poor population of Naryn.  
Despite of its relatively small population, Issyk Kul region revenue is comprised of more than 
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50% of local taxes collection and non-tax revenue due to operation in this Oblast of Gold mining 
company Kumtor, which raises average wage for the region.  
Following Table 3 shows total revenues and grants (in percentage), received by subnational 
governments as categorical and equalization grants compared with local revenues without the 
support of grants. It also gives comparison in share of subnational government revenues 
compared to national revenues and grants.  
Table 3 Relative Importance of Local Revenues 
  1997 1998 1999 
 In percentage terms, compared to republican budget 
Local Revenues and Grants compared 
to Republican Revenues and Grants 53.4% 47.2% 41.7% 
Local Revenues  without Grants 27.7% 26.2% 21.8% 
Local Taxes Compared to Republican 
Taxes 23.4% 25.3% 21.5% 
Local Non-tax revenue compared to 
Republican Non-tax revenue 56.9% 33.0% 25.1% 
Other Local revenues as % of total local revenues 
Grants  46.2% 47.4% 50.1% 
Categorical grants  41.1% 35.9% 35.7% 
Equalization grants  5.1% 9.6% 11.8% 
Table compiled from Ministry of Finance data files, published in ADP country report in 2000.   
Even though the data is covers the period from 1997 to 1999 we can observe the tendency and 
the relationship between local government’s own revenues decline and increase in equalization 
grants to compensate the difference. The main reason in decline of local revenues is the decline 
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of non-tax revenues (sudden drop from 60% in 1997 to 25% in 1999) and decline in local taxes 
collection. 
Main Conclusion made from given information is that the performance of subnational 
government in local tax collection as well as non-tax revenues significantly declined over the 
years, while the amount of grants (categorical and equalization) increased.  
Non-tax revenues include foreign and intergovernmental aid, revenues from state-owned 
enterprises, rents from goods and services given to private corporations, etc. Severe drop in non-
tax revenues of subnational government gives a certain signal of warning that subnational 
government loses its incentives for the efficiency or the level of corruption of local authorities 
increased. Decline of non-tax revenues down to 50% from 1997 to 1999 caused the increase of 
equalization grants from 5% in 1997 up to 12% in 1999 (more than 50%).  Thus, the subnational 
government, being aware of given pattern, has no incentives to increase their local profits and 
fully rely on grants transferred from national government. 
Figure 3 demonstrates expenditure assignments by region and function. Regional data is 
compared with Bishkek data.  
Previous Figure 2 showed that Bishkek, with the special status and higher authority delegated in 
the use of its budget resources, has nearly 70% of tax revenues and above 25% of non-tax 
revenues. Nevertheless, it has the lowest expenditure delegation on education, health and state 
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administration bodies among other regions, while these areas are central government-mandated 
spending. At the same time, it has the highest “other” expenditure, which includes capital or 
investment projects as well as other development projects.  
Figure 3: Oblast Spending by Function 
 
Source: ADB country report 2000 
Chui region has analogical expenditure delegations and is considered to be the richest oblast 
(excluding Bishkek, which is located in Chui region, as an independent city).  
Proposal introduced by Bahl (1994) in Literature Review of this research, on diversification of 
local tax base seems to be a good opportunity for local government to increase own finance.Thus, 
delegation of grants to subnational government could be reduced, and regional spending re-
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considered. Table 4 provides us with additional more recent information on inter budgetary 
relations and the amount of income delegated to each region. Given information is compared 
with Bishkek city that has a special status of a capital. It is interesting to notice that Bishkek and 
in some cases Osh have more privileges due to more diverse sources of revenue, and lesser flow 
of transfers and grants. That means that they are more flexible in resource usage and allocation. 
And thus, those factors will later result in regional economic performance and improvement of 
public service delivery compared to other regions which have little fiscal authority and act more 
like central government agents or administrators. Similar to previously used data as of 2000 
described in ADB country report, open budget portal as of 2008 shows that Bishkek has no 
revenue flow from grants to local budget, categorical or leveling grants, but received official 
transfers and transfers of general government. From another hand, Bishkek and Osh cities have 
privilege to collect income and profit taxes and have higher revenues compared with other 
regions, on other types of taxes.  
For the poorest oblasts Naryn and Batken, transfers and grants are the main sources of finance, 
several times exceeding revenue collected from local tax and non-tax sources of finance. At the 
same time, Naryn is assigned a high level of expenditure in health and education that could 
probably be reduced to foster fiscal development and certain degree of autonomy in those 
regions. 
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Table 4 inter budgetary relations 
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4.2 Analysis of second research question 
To address the second research question which aims to identify areas that hinder efficient 
service delivery and economic performance within the country, Flowchart of Analytical 
Framework is applied and further explained.  
Flowchart of Analytical Framework 
 
The main problem in transition of Kyrgyzstan to decentralized form of governance was caused 
by lack of resources and time to support fiscal decentralization. Central government informally 
keeps higher authority in budget distribution and expenditure planning as well as it approves 
local budget and decides the level of grants and transfers. Very often the budget approval is 
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based on negotiation bases, causing some regions to remain unfunded. Inefficiency influences 
the quality of public services and willingness of tax payers to contribute to regional development. 
Lack of connection between tax code and laws and their controversial positions (discussed in 
first chapters) makes it easier for governmental authorities to apply either one or another 
depending on each situation and own interest. Thus, if we look at the example of “unfunded” 
spending mandates delegated from regional level to municipal level, etc. we can get an idea.  
 
Chart of State Functions Distribution gives information on assignment of certain governmental 
level to provision of certain public services. For example, hospitals (Health) are included in the 
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regional level budget. When regional government faces the problem of budget deficit, due to 
unclear legislation about transfer of spending mandates, it can transfer hospital to municipal level, 
thus increasing local budget deficit.  
The problem is that by increasing the deficit and transferring unfunded spending mandates, not 
only the local budget deficit occurs, but it hinders the entire development process, lowering the 
level of service (healthcare, education, etc.) 
Legislation mentions the importance of local government, but in practice, local government takes 
a role of central government’s agent as well as administrative role, but their decision-making 
authority is limited and fiscal decisions are determined by regional administrators (who act as 
local representatives of central government) and the Ministry of Finance. For lowest level of 
government (aiyl okmotu), grants are the major source of finance, which is predetermined to be 
spent on funding central government programs on health and education, as we could see from 
Figure 3: Oblast spending by function.  
Local tax is the main source of revenue for local government, with land tax taking the largest 
share. Local taxes are administrated by the State Tax Inspectorate (central government agency).  
Unclear delegation of powers between levels of government makes it less transparent, with 
higher probability of corruption to take place.  
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4.2.1 Summary of the factors, hindering efficient service delivery and receipt of 
benefits brought with transition to decentralization:  
Transition to decentralized form of governance in Kyrgyzstan was quite rapid and not supported 
with financial resources. Due to mismatch in legislation, central government maintains high 
authority on local level, including local tax gathering and expenditure planning. Higher levels of 
government can transfer “unfunded” mandates to lower levels of government, thus not only 
increasing local budget deficit, but lowering the quality of public services delivered. Usage of 
grants, transferred from central to local government, is predetermined to be spent on funding 
central government programs on healthcare, education, etc.   
 
   
 
 
 
 
Chapter Five 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
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The last chapter aims to conclude main points raised in this research by summarizing key points, 
review research questions and results received. Two previously raised assumptions on impact of 
local revenues and amount of grants and transfers on incentive of key stakeholders as well as 
discussion on efficiency of current form of governance in Kyrgyzstan are further elaborated. 
5.1 Incentive mechanism that could be applied for sound system of relations between 
central and local government in Kyrgyzstan 
Conceptual framework and Analysis sections demonstrated a number of weaknesses of current, 
so-called “decentralized” form of governance. It is still questionable whether Kyrgyzstan has 
decentralized form of governance, or it is still centralized, as decentralization involves not only 
the expenditure assignment and revenue responsibilities, but also the extent of subnational 
policymaking autonomy. Even though subnational government is responsible for its own 
revenues and expenditure, central government maintains its authority in budget approval, 
controlling fiscal policies of subnational government through grants and transfers. Moreover, 
local authorities cannot determine tax rate for locally collected taxes, and National Tax 
Inspectorate administers all forms of taxes.  
Data analysis included comparison of Bishkek city, which has a special status, with remaining 
regions, that supported first assumption raised in this research that there is a strong relationship 
between regional economic performance and level of own revenues in comparison with amount 
of grants and transfers. The lesser the opportunity for the region to increase own funds due to 
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limited scope of local tax, the more it depends on national grants and transfers. Chapter Four 
provided good evidence when non-tax revenue declined twice, causing amount of transfers to 
increase for more that 60%. That leads to the fear of local authorities to increase efficiency of the 
region, as the amount of grants will be reduced. Moral Hazard includes lost of incentives of other 
regions to generate good income through collection of local tax, as leveling grants will be 
applied to solve horizontal imbalances. Higher degree of national spending (healthcare, 
education) is also a burden on regional government, as grants are spent for national spending and 
not regional development and sustainability. As a result, most oblasts and rayon face legal and 
financial imbalances between expenditures and revenues. 
Absence of transparent formula to estimate amount of transfers for next year is also causing 
some problems with budget planning, which effects overall efficiency of the region.  
Thus, steadily broadening the locally collected tax base, delegation of local authorities to 
determine interest rate and collect local taxes through local tax offices, but not through National 
Tax Inspectorate and slow reduction of national transfers and grants could be the first step 
towards sound system of relations between central and local governments in Kyrgyzstan.  
Municipal level of government should not be dependent on regional government, but receive 
autonomy and freedom to budget their own resources, receiving predictable transfers and grants 
based on clear formula.  
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Due to the large number of ayil okmotu and villages (2341, as mentioned in fiscal structure of 
Kyrgyzstan ), there might be a coordination problem, problem to collect taxes and data from 
municipal level (villages, towns), therefore rayon’s role could include data collection, as well as 
collection of local taxes through regional offices as it requires certain knowledge and skills. 
Rayon should perform linking role between central and local governments, without additional 
financing, except administration costs.  
As in practice Regional government (Oblast) are local representatives of central government 
(chart of state function distribution), they should officially act like central government agents and 
should not get transfers and be funded from central government budget. Regional government 
can be responsible for supervision or implementation of certain central government programs on 
a regional level. That would prevent a case of delegation of “unfunded” mandates to municipal 
level by regional level and increase of local budget deficit.  
By reducing the number of tires and clarification of rayon’s and regional government role, 
central government gets closer to local government, and overall accountability of government 
will increase.  
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5.1.1 Obstacles for given recommendations 
There are some obstacles hindering implementation of proposed plan. As previously described in 
first part of the research, there is a lack of qualified managers on local levels, budget deficit and 
ethnic tensions between Uzbek and Kyrgyz nationalities, who usually live in communities and in 
case if poorest region gets grants to solve horizontal imbalances, that might cause a conflict 
between these two nationalities.  
High level of corruption and high influence of informal institutes can be a big obstacle for proper 
decentralization. If the laws can be amended, reforms introduced, it is much more difficult to 
deal with corruption and ruling elites as well as highly influential informal institutes. It might 
take another generation of managers with different attitude to bring a change.  
Therefore, efficient transition to decentralization requires commitment, certain time, budget 
allocation, well-planning and development of SME on local levels to foster sustainable growth of 
the region.  
5.2 Identification of areas of fiscal decentralization principles that hinder efficient service 
delivery and economic performance within the country 
Identification of areas of fiscal decentralization principles that hinder efficient service delivery 
and economic performance within the country puts a big question mark on feasibility of 
proposed reforms. And the long-term cost on inefficient transition to decentralization is too high, 
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causing the decline in quality of public services delivery, burden on central government to 
provide higher amounts of grants and transfers and loss of motivation on behalf of local 
government to generate good revenues.  
Bahl (1994) made related comment about the preference of the country in selection its form of 
governance, taking into consideration its economy, population, size, historical background, etc. 
Kyrgyzstan is a small country with its population of 5 million, with weak economy. Centralized 
form of the governance might be more efficient for Kyrgyzstan, compared with current level of 
decentralization, to buffer external shocks, world prices increase, natural disasters, dry climate, 
etc. As given system makes certain individuals take their interest in their own interpretation of 
decentralization principles (central government continuous involvement into fiscal issues of 
subnational government, transfer of “unfunded” mandates to municipal level, unclear legislation 
that hinders transparency and clear separation of powers) going back to centralized form of 
governance will be more beneficial for the country’s economy, until the time when system is 
ready to take another change, taking more steady and planned approach.  
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Appendices 
period: January 1, 2011-June 26, 2011  Total Expenses by the territory 
     
Код Economic Classification 
Budgetary 
Funds (in 
Thousands som) 
Special funds (in 
thousands som) 
 
11111100 Income tax paid by a tax agent -70,39 0,00 
 
11123100 Tax on special funds of budgetary organizations 0,00 89,40 
 
13321400 
Funds transferred between levels of local 
budgets 2 113,50 0,00 
 
14235900 The fee for the provision of other services 0,00 0,00 
 
21111100 The basic wage 4 862 338,62 415 681,07 
 
21111200 Surcharges 1 037 515,00 109 623,94 
 
21111300 Additional benefits and compensation 637 410,41 171 274,00 
 
21112100 Part-time or contract employees 5 183,46 58 873,66 
 
21211100 Pension fund payments 929 434,07 95 016,69 
 
21211200 health insurance payments 101 491,59 10 638,58 
 
22111100 Transportation costs 45 060,25 21 464,84 
 
22111200 hotel costs 16 466,56 6 100,54 
 
22111300 per deem costs 16 425,57 6 457,79 
 
22112100 Transportation costs 22 900,61 9 034,06 
 
22112200 hotel costs 16 914,85 6 460,92 
 
22112300 per deem costs 13 010,54 5 146,05 
 22121100 water bills 35 119,73 6 489,27 
 
22121200 electricity bills 285 912,74 21 994,15 
 
22121300 heating bills 252 694,32 25 060,75 
 
22121400 gas bills 2 230,11 3 465,01 
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22121900 other services bills 6 547,55 724,09 
 
22122100 landline bills 63 494,29 10 550,28 
 
22122200 mobile bills 9 906,80 1 885,30 
 
22122300 communication services 514,73 144,95 
 
22122400 postal services 3 316,01 243,33 
 
22122500 fees for TV programs broadcasting 74 091,92 19,53 
 
22122900 Other types of services 11 697,50 6 319,48 
 
22131100 rental of offices 77 298,92 3 177,67 
 
22131200 equipment rental 115,35 140,79 
 
22131300 vehicles rental 648,65 132,90 
 
22131900 other types of rental 3 169,02 126,62 
 
22141100 gasoline, etc 92 399,09 25 808,36 
 
22141200 spare parts purchasing 27 052,38 9 708,91 
 
22141300 vehicles maintenance 6 269,97 1 834,99 
 
22141900 transportation costs (other) 34 547,64 3 662,11 
 
22151100 services of the lawyers 290,72 197,84 
 
22151200 consultants fees 699,48 196,80 
 
22151300 defense fees 25 626,09 6 474,21 
 
22151400 IT fees 1 568,92 1 245,39 
 
22151900 other fees mentioned by contract 15 668,64 11 245,19 
 
22152100 repairment of offices 144 900,25 22 197,39 
 
22152200 repairment of other buildings 8 680,35 2 765,77 
 
22152300 maintenance of equipment 2 217,19 2 673,38 
 
22153100 sanitary services 8 108,27 5 306,63 
 
22153200 maintenance of memorial and historical objects 15,00 0,00 
 
22153900 other services bills 1 951,75 1 341,19 
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22154100 training of governmental servants 596,94 839,87 
 
22155300 purchasing of equipment 29 727,53 10 849,97 
 
22155400 uniform purchasing, maintainance 3 983,42 1 529,62 
 
22155500 purchasing of coal 10 067,32 436,86 
 
22155600 purchasing of other fuel 9,00 0,00 
 
22155900 other purchasing 70 674,04 73 419,33 
 
22156100 representation costs 6 168,49 2 627,44 
 
22156200 costs for blans design 5 734,92 15 070,80 
 
22156900 other costs 971 502,03 119 770,04 
 
22157100 State securities costs 8,10 0,00 
 
22157200 banking costs 42,38 0,00 
 
22157300 banking costs 30,70 0,00 
 
22157400 treasury banking costs 29 562,71 0,00 
 
22161100 health care costs 1 424 456,04 54 572,23 
 
22171100 purchasing of medical devices 117 232,84 9 416,02 
 
22171200 purchasing of medical devices 19 307,88 0,00 
 
22181100 purchasing of food items 583 159,45 123 452,16 
 
22181200 subsidies for food items 73 021,39 27 614,44 
 
24111100 banking costs 1 104 830,29 0,00 
 
24211100 banking costs 131 690,84 0,00 
 
24211200 banking costs 325 231,92 0,00 
 
24221100 financial costs 60,32 0,00 
 
25111100 subsidies  968 028,86 465,33 
 
25121100 subsidies for financial institutions 9 273,00 12 098,21 
 
25211100 subsidies for private entrepreneurs 66 562,42 0,00 
 
26211100 payment for international organizations 22 656,05 1 478,10 
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26211200 other payments 67 524,39 0,00 
 
26311100 CATEGORIAL GRANTS 2 349 339,60 0,00 
 
26311200 LEVELING GRANTS 582 884,00 0,00 
 
26312100 Transfers to local budgets 716 817,30 0,00 
 
26312300 increase of salaries 1 500 610,50 0,00 
 
26312400 horizontal transfers 27 528,46 0,00 
 
27111100 pensions for social insurance 1 256 722,44 0,00 
 
27111200 other pensions 349 766,51 0,00 
 
27111300 pensions for war participants 563 150,00 0,00 
 
27111400 social pensions 568 720,00 0,00 
 
27112100 military pensions 12 500,00 0,00 
 
27113100 payment assistance to eldery people  872 549,46 0,00 
 
27113200 other compensations 25 654,89 0,00 
 
27114100 assitance for disabled 39 778,32 0,00 
 
27114200 other pensions 106 563,67 0,00 
 
27115100 health insurance for kids 54 001,56 0,00 
 
27115200 health insurance for eldery 65 646,91 0,00 
 
27115300 other health insurance 2 906,03 sis 
 
27211100 other social payments 423 314,95 189,52 
 
27211200 payment after child birth 13 812,64 83,05 
 
27211300 mother's assistance 185 257,49 0,00 
 
27211400 unemployment benefits 3 203,17 0,00 
 
27211500 social compensations 625 415,56 15,00 
 
27211600 social compensations 1 319,91 0,00 
 
27212100 unemployment benefits 268,57 0,00 
 
27212200 maternity benefits 45 970,44 -91,16 
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27212300 assistance in funerals 6 116,14 139,10 
 
27213100 other assistances 1 461 505,91 691,58 
 
27214100 training expenses 12 188,38 0,00 
 
27214200 other expenses 18 022,23 159,19 
 
27214300 microcredit expenses 3 428,60 0,00 
 
27215100 health expenses 1 056,60 0,00 
 
27216100 
assistance for victims of 
earthquakes, etc 23 494,49 0,00 
 28211100 scholarships 49 490,95 6 725,58 
 
28212100 court expenses 29 542,06 617,13 
 
28213100 other expenses 9 391,80 482,67 
 
28215100 insurance reserves 23,00 0,00 
 
28215200 insurance reserves 63 295,07 0,00 
 28216900 pension funds  5 418,20 0,00 
 
28217100 program of state investments 114 935,43 0,00 
 
31111210 purchasing and construction of apartments 1 380,00 14 793,68 
 
31111290 purchasing of other construction items 141 531,98 2,00 
 
31111390 reparment of construction items 1 022 276,32 855,00 
 
31112110 sale of production items 0,00 697,50 
 
31112120 sale of buildings 50,00 0,00 
 
31112210 
purchasing and repair of administrative 
equipments 5 500,00 0,00 
 
31112220 
purchasing and repair of administrative 
equipments 0,00 13 560,00 
 
31112290 
purchasing and repair of administrative 
equipments 30 768,46 5 140,54 
 
31112310 repair of construction items 1 038,76 253,46 
 
31112320 Repair of construction items 581,00 6 775,78 
 
31112330 repair of construction items 220,40 0,00 
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31112390 repair of construction items 105 411,22 7 504,87 
 
31113190 sales of other buildings 0,00 52,10 
 
31113210 construction of production sites 2 479,00 0,00 
 
31113220 road building 95,00 0,00 
 
31113290 other purchasing 27 590,86 8 586,94 
 
31113310 repair of construction items 58 511,75 0,00 
 
31113320 road repair 387 151,30 13 183,39 
 
31113330 bridge repair 895,85 0,00 
 
31113390 repair of other items 112 758,10 7 270,03 
 
31121210 purchasing of vehicles 882,00 0,00 
 
31121230 purchasing of vehicles 771,19 0,00 
 
31121290 purchasing of vehicles 2 447,10 20,00 
 
31121310 repair of vehicles 92,00 50,00 
 
31121330 repair of vehicles 4,00 0,00 
 
31121350 Repair of boats 1 589,00 0,00 
 
31121390 Repair  of vehicles 100,00 4,00 
 
31122210 purchasing of production equipment 611,46 4,00 
 
31122220 purchasing of agricultural equipment 1 025,00 71,00 
 
31122290 purchasing of other equipment 14 225,28 2 932,00 
 
31122310 Repair of equipment 0,00 3,00 
 
31122390 repair of equipment 633,39 93,30 
 31123110 sales of furniture 0,00 81,48 
 
31123120 sales of office equipment -10,00 57,00 
 
31123130 sales of computer equipment 12,00 431,95 
 
31123210 purchasing of furniture 3 060,69 5 724,81 
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31123220 purchasing of office equipment 1 064,22 1 057,74 
 
31123230 purchasing of computer equipment 9 626,73 23 014,20 
 
31123240 purchasing of tools 397,60 462,78 
 
31123250 purchasing of books, etc 102,00 3 807,84 
 
31123290 purchasing of other equipment 10 566,68 7 410,09 
 
31131210 purchasing of seeds 0,00 34,20 
 
31131220 purchasing of plants 628,66 16,20 
 
31131230 purchasing of animals 0,00 43,30 
 
31131290 purchasing of cultivated actives 200,00 0,00 
 
31132110 sales of copyrights 0,00 20,00 
 
31132290 purchasing of other actives 18,70 1,35 
 
31412220 purchasing of land for production 0,00 0,00 
 
31412290 purchasing of land for other purposes 35,00 0,00 
 
32141110 repayments by subnational government 200,00 0,00 
 
32141190 repayments by subnational government 598,80 0,00 
 
32141290 loans for subnational government 11 772,72 0,00 
 
32142130 other repayments 1 625,00 0,00 
 
32142220 loans for financial institutions 630 000,00 0,00 
 
32142230 other loans 80 932,37 0,00 
 
33131210 repayments of mutual agreements 1 569 521,71 0,00 
 
33131290 repayments of mutual agreements 50 000,00 0,00 
 
33132210 repayments of mutual agreements 578 600,00 0,00 
 
33141110 repayments of mutual agreements -4 900,00 0,00 
 
33141210 repayments of mutual agreements 238,12 0,00 
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33241210 repayments of mutual agreements 191 732,01 0,00 
 
33242210 repayments of mutual agreements 672 377,10 0,00 
 
  total 32 864 723,04 1 677 661,44 
 
 
Classification of Revenues (1 January-26 June, 2011) 
      
code Economic Classification 
Central 
Budget 
Local Budget Total 
 
11111100 income tax paid by income agency 
1 277 793 695,
75 
677 505 189,
71 
1 955 298 885,
46 
 
11111200 income tax by tax declaration 952 364,21 581 765,40 1 534 129,61 
 
11112100 non-resident income tax 
229 359 266,1
3 0,00 229 359 266,13 
 
11113100 income tax 
1 537 905 669,
54 0,00 
1 537 905 669,
54 
 
11311200 real estate tax 0,00 
266 071 838,
03 266 071 838,03 
 
11312100 transportation tax 0,00 6 401 315,78 6 401 315,78 
 
11312110 transportation tax of juridical bodies 0,00 
62 204 821,1
6 62 204 821,16 
 
11312120 personal transportation tax 0,00 
192 256 852,
74 192 256 852,74 
 
11321100 land tax  0,00 
59 755 836,7
7 59 755 836,77 
 
11321200 land tax in the disposal of farmers 0,00 
80 367 745,8
5 80 367 745,85 
 
11321300 land tax in urban areas 0,00 
217 597 413,
88 217 597 413,88 
 
11411100 
VAT for products and services made 
in KR 
2 193 496 175,
66 0,00 
2 193 496 175,
66 
 
11411200 VAT for imported goods 
5 838 151 775,
93 0,00 
5 838 151 775,
93 
 
11412100 Sales tax 
907 052 698,4
4 
907 052 724,
57 
1 814 105 423,
01 
 
11413100 road tax 1 553 854,20 0,00 1 553 854,20 
 
11414100 payments for social security 1 776 736,46 0,00 1 776 736,46 
 
11421000 other tax 
290 042 032,1
9 0,00 290 042 032,19 
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11422000 other tax 
613 401 299,6
1 0,00 613 401 299,61 
 
11441100 fuel 859 181,42 0,00 859 181,42 
 
11441200 metal 
185 953 058,8
0 0,00 185 953 058,80 
 
11441300 non-metal natural resources 1 771 128,45 0,00 1 771 128,45 
 11441400 underground waters 1 432 095,55 0,00 1 432 095,55 
 
11442100 fuel 16 450 294,98 0,00 16 450 294,98 
 
11442200 metal 13 275 702,00 0,00 13 275 702,00 
 
11442300 non-metal natural resources 17 164 362,75 0,00 17 164 362,75 
 
11442400 underground waters 20 812 983,51 0,00 20 812 983,51 
 
11511100 duty tax 
915 103 517,7
7 0,00 915 103 517,77 
 
11511200 duty tax 
1 649 045 957,
87 0,00 
1 649 045 957,
87 
 
11512100 duty tax -1 947 861,34 0,00 -1 947 861,34 
 
11513100 duty tax 4 160 337,27 0,00 4 160 337,27 
 
11514100 other duty taxes 143 360,00 0,00 143 360,00 
 
11611000 other taxes 0,00 1 403 367,98 1 403 367,98 
 
14111100 national bank deposit tax 25 884 256,46 0,00 25 884 256,46 
 
14112100 interest rates 
201 270 807,8
9 0,00 201 270 807,89 
 
14121100 dividents 
2 335 369 278,
01 0,00 
2 335 369 278,
01 
 
14122100 revenues of national bank 
1 103 992 940,
00 0,00 
1 103 992 940,
00 
 
14152110 
payment for rental of buildings and 
land 0,00 
100 768 115,
24 100 768 115,24 
 
14152120 payment for rental of pastures 0,00 0,00 0,00 
 
14152121 payment for rental of pastures 0,00 828 661,30 828 661,30 
 
14152122 payment of rental of pastures 0,00 252 326,80 252 326,80 
 14152123 Плата за аренду отгонных пастбищ 0,00 816 853,00 816 853,00 
 
14153900 payment for rent  other items 0,00 
17 604 912,6
9 17 604 912,69 
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14221100 licensing profit 
143 295 526,2
8 0,00 143 295 526,28 
 
14221200 revenue from giving certificates 54 012 282,15 0,00 54 012 282,15 
 
14221300 lottery patent 1 175 081,56 0,00 1 175 081,56 
 
14221400 payment for vehicles registration 
149 117 136,0
7 0,00 149 117 136,07 
 14221500 other payment 1 325 154,00 0,00 1 325 154,00 
 
14221600 payment for accounts services 120,00 0,00 120,00 
 
14221700 collection of personal payments 0,00 
27 290 524,5
1 27 290 524,51 
 
14221800 parking revenue 0,00 9 326 804,00 9 326 804,00 
 
14221900 other payments 0,00 2 814,00 2 814,00 
 
14222100 
Governmental duty for imported 
goods 1 997 520,86 0,00 1 997 520,86 
 
14222200 
Governmental duty for imported 
goods 0,00 
121 833 572,
31 121 833 572,31 
 
14222300 Governmental fee for legislation 10 398 652,37 0,00 10 398 652,37 
 
14222400 Other governmental fees 15 647,00 0,00 15 647,00 
 
14235100 vehicle fees 2 062 657,41 0,00 2 062 657,41 
 
14311100 administrative fines 
108 218 466,1
1 
49 959 988,9
4 158 178 455,05 
 
14311200 fines for non-licenses trading 33 489 672,00 0,00 33 489 672,00 
 
14311300 fines for non-licenses trading 1 126 852,00 0,00 1 126 852,00 
 
14311400 fines for non-licenses trading 12 357 054,55 1 625 326,91 13 982 381,46 
 
14311500 reimbursement for economic crime 4 044 433,32 1 335 637,50 5 380 070,82 
 
14511100 nationalized property 53 495 957,98 2 331 015,89 55 826 973,87 
 
14511200 other non-tax revenues 474 964,65 
15 914 516,3
7 16 389 481,02 
 
14511300 loss -49 491 820,50 0,00 -49 491 820,50 
 
31111110 apartment sales 0,00 
54 566 947,0
3 54 566 947,03 
 31111120 house sales 18 000,00 0,00 18 000,00 
 
31111190 other buildings sales 0,00 3 740 910,00 3 740 910,00 
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31112190 other buildings sales 0,00 1 527 065,00 1 527 065,00 
 
31113190 other buildings sales 9 680,00 128 440,00 138 120,00 
 
31121110 vehicles sales 156 090,00 47 593,00 203 683,00 
 
31121130 vehicles sales 21 285,00 0,00 21 285,00 
 
31122120 agricultural equipment sales 0,00 69 170,00 69 170,00 
 
31122190 other equipment sales 0,00 230 000,00 230 000,00 
 
31131120 plants sales 0,00 71 500,00 71 500,00 
 
31211110 fuel sales 
176 176 471,5
7 0,00 176 176 471,57 
 
31411110 agricultural land sales 0,00 7 650 236,00 7 650 236,00 
 
31412110 non-agricultural land sales 0,00 
50 345 024,6
4 50 345 024,64 
 
32141190 
payment of debts by other 
governmental units 491 919,00 2 458 500,00 2 950 419,00 
 
33141110 
borrowing from other governmental 
units 0,00 6 872 715,00 6 872 715,00 
 
  Total 
24 430 742 94
9,58 
3 699 680 40
6,57 
28 130 423 356
,15 
 Source: http://portal.infosystema.kg/openbudget/income/main.action 
 
Population in Poverty Urban/RURAL (Rural Poverty 
(Poverty Portal) 
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